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THE PRETRIAL IMPORTANCE AND
ADAPTATION OF THE "TRIAL"
EVIDENCE RULES
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
In big litigation today, pre-trial is the trial.,
This symposium poses the question, "Does evidence law matter?"
The question is an ambiguous one.' The diverse interpretations of this
topic by the various contributing authors reinforce the wisdom of
Voltaire's teaching that if we are to conduct a rational discourse about a
potentially ambiguous topic, we must first define our terms.
3
The first term in need of definition is "evidence law." For the pur-
poses of this paper, "evidence law" is the common-law and statutory ex-
clusionary rules of evidence-rules such as the hearsay and opinion
doctrines, which operate to exclude logically'relevant evidence. Dean
Wigmore points out that our extensive set of exclusionary rules distin-
guishes Anglo-American evidence law.4 In this century the English have
substantially liberalized their admissibility standards,5 leaving the United
States with the dubious distinction of enforcing "the most complex, re-
strictive set of [exclusionary] evidentiary rules in the world."6
The next term requiring definition is "matter." In the context of
this Essay, what do we mean when we say that an exclusionary rule
"matters"? The dictionary tells us that when "matter" is used as a verb,
its most common meaning is "to be of importance."7 If we define "evi-
dence law" and "matter" in this fashion, the question then becomes
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools; B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969, San Francisco.
1. Charles Maher, Discovery Abuse, 4 CAL. LAW. 44, 46 (1984) (quoting Professor Geof-
frey Hazard, Jr.).
2. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 757,
760-62 (1992) (addressing whether rape shield rules matter); Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal
Rules of Evidence Matter, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 909, 909-10 (1992) (discussing whether wit-
ness competency and impeachment rules matter).
3. THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 428 (Burton Steven-
son ed., 10th ed. 1967) ("If you wish to converse with me, define your terms.").
4. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 244, at 724 (3d ed. 1984).
5. R. A. Clark, The Changing Face of the Rule Against Hearsay in English Law, 21 AK-
RON L. REV. 67, 72 (1987); Di Birch, The Evidence Provisions, 1989 THE CRIM. L. REV. 15.
6. RONALD CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 3 (3d ed. 1991).
7. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1394 (1976).
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whether the exclusionary evidentiary rules affect the outcome of cases
litigated in the United States.
Of course at some stages in the processing of a case, federal evidence
law is not designed to "matter." For instance, Rule of Evidence
1101(d)(2) specifically states that the exclusionary doctrines announced
by the Federal Rules do not apply to grand jury hearings.8 Rule
1101(d)(3) is equally explicit and states that the exclusionary rules are
inapplicable to "[p]roceedings for extradition or rendition; preliminary
examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking pro-
bation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search
warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise." 9
Relaxed admissibility standards are permissible at these proceedings be-
cause the tribunal stops short of making final judgments on the questions
of liability and guilt.
With these exceptions, however, the exclusionary rules set out in the
Federal Rules "apply generally to civil actions and proceedings... [and]
to criminal cases and proceedings."' Thus, at trials and pretrial pro-
ceedings, the exclusionary rules apply because the tribunal is empowered
to make final judgments about the merits of the case. At these proceed-
ings, evidence law is supposed to matter. The issue that naturally arises
is whether the exclusionary rules really "matter" even at these proceed-
ings. Do the exclusionary rules have a marked impact on the outcome of
these proceedings?
The sad truth is that the question cannot be answered absolutely. In
1971-in one of the initial issues of this law review-Professor Kenneth
Graham of UCLA Law School bemoaned the lack of hard data on the
operative effect of the American exclusionary rules. 1 Two decades later,
his UCLA colleague, Professor Paul Bergman reported that the neces-
sary empirical data base remains virtually nonexistent.12 Worse still, as
Bergman noted, there is no realistic likelihood of such a data base in the
foreseeable future. 3 In Professor Graham's words, if we attempted to
determine the absolute effect of the exclusionary rules, we would perforce
rely on "an exchange of anecdotes rather than any intelligent discussion
8. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2).
9. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
10. FED. R. EVID. 1101(b).
11. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections
on Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 279, 280 (1971).
12. Paul Bergman, Of Bentham, Wigmore, and Little Bo Peep: Where Evidence Lost Its
Way, andA Map for Scholars to Find It, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 958 (1991).
13. Id. at 963.
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on the effect of the rules in the trial of cases."' 4
Yet we can make some confident generalizations about the relative
importance of evidence law at the various stages of legal proceedings. At
which stage does evidence law "matter" most? Although we are accus-
tomed to thinking of the exclusionary rules as "trial" evidence doc-
trines, 5 the thesis of this Essay is that modem evidence law matters most
at pretrial stages, such as hearings on summary judgment and in limine
motions. Accordingly, the first section of this Essay describes the condi-
tions for maximizing the impact of evidence law, that is, the conditions
under which the exclusionary rules have their greatest effect. The second
section argues that those conditions are present at pretrial proceedings,
such as summary judgment motions, to a greater extent than they are at
trial. The third section speculates about the possible long-term impact of
the emergence of pretrial hearings as the stage of litigation most pro-
foundly affected by evidence law. This emergence may and should lead
to a modification of evidence law itself.
I. THE CONDITIONS FOR MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF EVIDENCE
LAW
If evidence law is to "matter" at a particular stage in a legal pro-
ceeding, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the exclusionary rules for-
mally apply at that stage. Even if the hearsay rule is technically
applicable to a particular stage under Federal Rule 1101(b), the rule may
have no significant impact on the outcome of the hearing; the partici-
pants-the judge and attorneys-may be unwilling or unable to enforce
the rule at that stage. What set of conditions would maximize their moti-
vation and their ability to enforce exclusionary rules such as the hearsay
doctrine?
A. The Role of the Party Entitled to Invoke the Exclusionary Rule
Before the exclusionary rule can "matter" at a particular hearing,
the party entitled to invoke the exclusionary rule must have both the
time and the motivation to voice an objection based on the rule. Some
exclusionary objections are difficult to recognize. The common-law Mor-
14. Graham, supra note 11, at 280.
15. The text writers often allude to "trial" evidence law in the very titles of their works.
ANTHONY J. BOCCHINO, TRIAL EVIDENCE: MAKING AND MEETING OBJECTIONS (1986);
EDWIN C. CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE (1956) (2 vols.); MARK A. DOMBROFF,
TRIAL OBJECTIONS (1985); JOHN C. O'BRIEN & ROGER L. GOLDMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL EVIDENCE (1989); GEORGE B. RICHTER, EVIDENTIARY TRIAL OBJECTIONS (1984);
CHARLES E. WAGNER, 1 FEDERAL TRIAL EVIDENCE (rev. ed. 1990).
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gan hearsay or "implied assertion" objection is a case in point. Under
this doctrine, the hearsay definition includes nonverbal conduct actuated
by a belief when the conduct is offered as evidence of the truth of the
belief. 16
In the leading case, Wright v. Tatham,17 the question presented was
whether a decedent, John Marsden, was mentally competent when he
executed his will. The proponent of the will offered as evidence the fact
that some of Marsden's acquaintances sent serious letters to him.18 Their
act of sending the letters was prompted by their belief that Marsden was
mentally competent, as they obviously would not have gone to the
trouble to send the letters unless they thought he was capable of under-
standing their content.1 9 The proponent reasoned that if Marsden's ac-
quaintances sent him serious letters, their conduct was some evidence of
Marsden's competence.2° The English court held that the evidence was
hearsay; the opponent did not have an opportunity to question the ac-
quaintances about their perception and memory. 2'
This decision underscores a longstanding controversy about whether
the hearsay definition should reach this far. The drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence answered the question in the negative.2 2 One of the
principal arguments against Morgan hearsay is that practitioners have
difficulty recognizing the objection. The issue is so subtle that "more
often than not [the objection is] simply . . . overlooked. ' 23 Thus,
although the exclusionary rules vary in their complexity, some are so
challenging that without time to carefully analyze the evidence, the party
entitled to invoke an exclusionary rule may inadvertently waive the
objection.
Furthermore, even if the party recognizes the objection, the party
may have a disincentive to make the objection. Conventional wisdom
mandates that a trial attorney not raise every possible objection,24 partic-
ularly in the presence of a lay juror:
The more often you object, the greater is the risk that you will
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 250.
17. 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 489 (Ex. Ch. 1837).
18. Id. at 501.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 511.
22. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 739-40; see also Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them
Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
MINN. L. REv. 783, 802 (1990) (there are very few reported cases on this question).
24. John C. Conti, Trial Objections, 14 LrNG. 16, 17 (1987).
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alienate the jury; they may conclude that you are trying to sup-
press the truth.... [S]uppose that the probable answer will do
only minimal damage to your case. Here too many veteran
trial attorneys forego the objection. They fear that the argu-
ment over the question will only highlight the testimony and
heighten the damage.25
Thus, even when parties realize that they could cite an exclusionary rule
to bar the admission of an item of evidence, they often waive the objec-
tion on the theory that an argument over the objection would heighten
the damaging impact of the testimony.26 Hence, even if the item of evi-
dence is excludible and its exclusion could affect the outcome of the hear-
ing, the exclusionary rule will often never come into play.
B. The Role of the Presiding Officer Obliged to Enforce the
Exclusionary Rule
The presiding officer, like the party entitled to invoke the exclusion-
ary rule, may be disinclined to enforce the rule. Just as the party may
need time to recognize the objection, the judge may need time to assess
the proponent's theory of admissibility and the opponent's objection.27
Further, the judge, like the party, may have a disincentive to apply an
exclusionary rule. In a judge's Case, the disincentive is usually the fear of
reversal. Although it is possible, even during trial, for the judge to delay
ruling on the objection, a delay can create administrative difficulties. If
the judge recesses the trial to scrutinize the evidence more carefully, the
recess may inconvenience the attorneys, witnesses, and jurors by pro-
longing the trial. Further, if the judge admits the evidence conditionally
25. RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRAC-
TICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 86-87 (1989).
26. See Virginia Cope, Can Jurors Ignore Inadmissible Evidence, 24 TRIAL 80, 81 (1988):
A judge's admonishments to a jury to disregard evidence may actually strengthen the
evidence's biasing effects, a new study suggests. Psychologist John Carroll of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently completed a study .... [His] prelim-
inary analysis suggests that judicial instructions make matters worse.... [J]urors
tend to think, 'The evidence must be even more important if they have to tell me to
ignore it.'
Id.; see also Michael Allen, When Jurors Are Ordered to Ignore Testimony, They Ignore the
Order, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at B33 (addressing recent studies indicating jurors not able
to filter out forbidden information); Paul Marcotte, The Jury Will Disregard. .. , 73 A.B.A. J.
34 (1987) (summarizing recent American Bar Foundation research project calling into ques-
tion ability of lay jurors to disregard evidence).
27. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial
Discovery of the Prosecution's Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 247,
255-57 (1987) (issue of admissibility of uncharged misconduct under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) can be so complex that judge may need substantial time to reach informed decision).
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and later decides that the evidence is inadmissible, the judge may have to
declare a mistrial because the jury will have been exposed to inadmissi-
ble, perhaps prejudicial, evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves are perhaps the most im-
portant disincentive to enforcing exclusionary rules because they place
more pressure than ever before on the presiding officer to resolve any
doubt in favor of admitting the evidence. The Federal Rules have a
built-in bias in favor of the introduction of relevant evidence. Rules 401
through 403 embody the bias. Rule 401 contains one of the broadest
possible definitions of relevance: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."28 Notably, Federal Rule 401
does not limit the definition to evidence pertinent to "disputed" ques-
tions.29 Rule 402 adds to Rule 401 by declaring that "[a]ll relevant evi-
dence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."3
The statute omits any mention of case or decisional law. There is a
strong statutory construction argument that the omission is purposeful,
manifesting Congress's intent to deprive the courts of the power to en-
force uncodified exclusionary rules.3 Finally, while Rule 403 authorizes
the judge to exclude logically relevant evidence when its probative worth
"is substantially outweighed" by attendant probative dangers such as
prejudice,32 that statute also reflects a bias in favor of admissibility.
Under Rule 403, the party opposing the admission of relevant evidence
has the burden of persuading the judge that the probative dangers out-
strip the probative value by a wide margin. 3 Under the regime of the
28. FED. R. EvID. 401.
29. The absence of such a limitation is not consistent with the evidence rules of other
jurisdictions. In California, for instance, relevant evidence includes evidence that proves or
disproves any disputed fact. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1984); see also FED. R. EVID. 401
advisory committee's note (rule limiting admissibility to evidence directed to controversial
point would exclude helpful evidence); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to "Plead Out"
Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil
Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal Protection, 40 EMORY L.J. 341, 352
n.59 (1991) (facts to which evidence directed need not be in dispute).
30. FED. R. EVID. 402.
31. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6
REV. LrrxG. 129, 130 (1987).
32. FED. R. EVID. 403.
33. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (1985).
Although a proper reading of Rule 403 and its legislative history leads to allocating the burden
[Vol. 25:965
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Federal Rules, the judge's mindset must be, "when in doubt, admit."34
Yet another factor reinforces this mindset. In 1967, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an ac-
cused the implied right to present relevant, critical evidence-a right
which the accused can invoke to override exclusionary doctrines. 35 De-
fendants have used this constitutional provision to surmount objections
based on witness competency rules, 36 restrictions on scientific evidence,37
limitations on impeachment, 38 rape shield laws, 39 privileges' and the
hearsay doctrine.4 1 Some commentators have further argued that the
courts should recognize an analogous right in civil actions under the pro-
cedural due process guarantee.42 These constitutional rights make the
presiding officer still more reticent to enforce exclusionary rules. In
to the opponent resisting the admission of relevant evidence, until recently some courts tended
to continue to enforce the common-law approach of assigning the proponent the risk of non-
persuasion. See, e.g., United States v. Cordell, 912 F.2d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 1990); Doty v.
Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Ross, 886 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir.
1989); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:28
(1984) (stating that some courts continue to place burden of persuasion on proponent). How-
ever, the Advisory Committee's note to the 1990 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a) should end that tendency. As amended, the face of Rule 609(a) refers to two balancing
tests, one peculiar to 609(a), the other the residual balancing test under Rule 403. FED. R.
EVID. 609(a). The accompanying Advisory Committee's note specifically states that when the
403 balancing test governs, the party opposing the admission of relevant evidence bears the
burden. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee's note.
34. Edward J. Imwinkelried, When in Doubt, Admit, 10 CAL. LAW. 72, 73 (1990).
35. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 22-23 (1967); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE § 2-2 (1990).
36. E.g., Washington, 388 U.S. 14; see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, § 4-2, at 83-85
(discussing accused's right to attack incompetency doctrine articulated in Washington).
37. E.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note
35, § 6-4, 6-5 (discussing right of accused to present evidence regarding testimony based on
scientific technique).
38. E.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-
18 (1974); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35,
§§ 8-2 to 8-9 (discussing right of accused to override traditional limits on impeachment).
39. E.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988); Davis, 415 U.S. at 320; see also
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, § 9-4 (discussing right of accused to present evidence other-
wise barred by rape shield laws).
40. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-54 (1987) (psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974) (executive privilege); Washington,
388 U.S. at 23 (attorney-client privilege); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, §§ 10-5, 12-2
(discussing right of accused to present privileged evidence).
41. E.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839
F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1988); see Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (implying applica-
tion of hearsay rule violation of Sixth Amendment Due Process Clause); see also IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 35, § 14-2 (discussing right of accused to override hearsay doctrine).
42. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New Constitutional Entitlement:
The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 1.
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short, the fear of reversal, the constitutional right to present critical evi-
dence and the bias of the Federal Rules themselves create a substantial
disincentive to apply exclusionary rules. If the evidentiary question
arises unexpectedly and the officer has any substantial doubt about the
applicability of the exclusionary rule, the sensible course for the officer is
to overrule the objection.
II. THE MAXIMUM IMPACT OF EXCLUSIONARY EVIDENTIARY
RULES AT THE POSTPLEADING, PRETRIAL STAGE
Having listed the conditions under which there is a disincentive to
apply exclusionary rules, this Essay will now examine the various stages
in the litigation process to identify the stage at which these conditions are
least present. It will quickly become apparent that the "trial" evidence
rules matter most at the postpleading, pretrial stage.
Evidence law matters the least at the prepleading stage. Before the
opening pleadings have been filed, the parties may have had little oppor-
tunity to gather potential evidence. In this stage there is virtually no
opportunity for formal discovery. Although the rules of civil procedure
in most jurisdictions authorize prefiling depositions to preserve evi-
dence,43 they are the only formal discovery device the parties can use
before filing, and are rarely employed.' Further, even if the parties have
collected potential evidence, they may have had little chance to analyze
the admissibility of their own evidence, much less that of the opposing
party. Consequently, when the parties settle at this stage, the exclusion-
ary rules ordinarily have minimal impact. In fact, the parties may be
settling to obviate the necessity of incurring the expense of gathering po-
tential evidence and evaluating its admissibility.
At the pleading stage, the exclusionary doctrines continue to have
little effect. For instance, in ruling on a motion to dismiss or a demurrer,
the presiding officer must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts.45 As
a general proposition, the officer must assume that the pleader will ulti-
mately be able to produce admissible evidence to support the allegations
in the pleading.46 The only exception to this proposition is the judicial
43. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS § 5:16 (1986).
44. "The use of declaratory judgment actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57
has reduced the need for prefiling depositions." Id.
45. Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 84 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Aragon-Haas v.
Family Sec. Ins. Servs., 231 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238, 282 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237 (1991).
46. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Shapiro v. Royal Indem. Co., 100 F. Supp. 801, 802 (W.D. Pa.
1951).
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notice doctrine.47 In upholding a pleading, the presiding officer may as-
sume judicially noticeable facts even if the pleader failed to allege them.4"
Likewise, the officer may invalidate a pleading based on a defect which
has not been alleged if the defect is based on judicially noticeable facts.49
With the exception of the judicial notice doctrine, however, the exclu-
sionary rules are largely irrelevant at the pleading stage.
By the same token, the rules are, for the most part, irrelevant in the
discovery phase immediately following pleading. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), which defines the scope of permissible discovery,
states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action."5 Thus, in the discovery stage the concept of logical relevance is
even broader than it is at trial under Evidence Rule 401. By using the
expression, "relevant to the subject matter," Rule 26 manifests an intent
that discovery not be confined to the precise allegations of the plead-
ings." Rule 26 allows discovery to probe an issue as long as the plead-
ings could be amended to include that issue.52 The privilege doctrines,
therefore, are the only major evidentiary constraints that operate at this
stage.
At the trial phase, the exclusionary rules are certainly relevant. But
even here, the conditions are far from optimal for maximizing the impact
of the rules. As this Essay points out above, the party entitled to invoke
the rule at trial may lack the time to recognize an objection resting on a
nicety of the exclusionary rules.5 3 If the hearing is a jury trial, the jury's
presence may also make the party reluctant to raise certain objections.
Further, the presiding officer may not aggressively enforce the exclusion-
ary rules at trial.54 If the issue arises on the spur of the moment and the
officer is at all in doubt, Rules 401 through 403 pressure the judge to
overrule the objection.55
47. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991); Nejad v. United
States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 754 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508
F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037,
1041, 243 Cal. Rptr. 306, 308 (1988). Judicial notice is "[t]he act by which a court,... of its
own motion or on request of a party, and without the production of evidence, recognize[s] the
existence and truth of certain facts, having a bearing on the controversy at bar." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Gilbert v. State, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 240-41, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891, 894 (1990).
49. Lazzarone v. Bank of Am., 181 Cal. App. 3d 581, 590, 226 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (1986).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
51. IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 43, § 2:03, at 3.
52. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
53. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
55. See FED. R. EvID. 401-403.
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By process of elimination, the latter part of the pretrial stage-the
stage following both the filing of pleadings and the conduct of discov-
ery-is most affected by the exclusionary rules. At this juncture, the par-
ties can resort to such procedural devices as summary judgment motions
and in limine motions. This is the stage at which evidence law matters
most.
A. Summary Judgment Motions
The conditions at this point in the pretrial proceedings are ideal for
maximizing the impact of the exclusionary rules. By now the parties
have had ample opportunity to conduct formal and informal discovery,1
6
and have collected most, if not all, of the potential evidence for trial.
When one party files a summary judgment motion, both parties will be
afforded the opportunity to reduce relevant evidentiary matter to affida-
vits or declarations.57 Both parties can methodically review the affidavits
to identify any objectionable evidence, rather than being required to ob-
ject on a moment's notice at trial. Moreover, both the party entitled to
invoke an exclusionary rule and the presiding officer have more incentive
to enforce the rules at this stage. There is no jury for the party to antago-
nize by objecting. If the evidentiary objection is a close call in the of-
ficer's mind, the officer can simply take the objection under advisement
and rule later, after conducting any necessary legal research and analysis.
The administrative pressures which often necessitate an immediate, on-
the-spot ruling at trial are absent. The net result is that the exclusionary
rules can be carefully considered and rigorously enforced in the context
of a summary judgment motion.58
Not only are exclusionary rules likely to have a substantial impact in
the summary judgment context, summary judgment motions are them-
selves more likely today than in the past because the United States
Supreme Court has revitalized summary judgment procedure within the
56. Elvis Presley Ent. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991) (party
suffering summary judgment must have already had adequate time for discovery); United
States ex rel Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Tech., 777 F. Supp. 195, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. On the one hand, it is true that the evidence mentioned in the
affidavits and declarations need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial. Colgan v.
Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991). On the other hand, it must be clear
that the evidence could be reduced to admissible form. Lawyers Alliance v. Department of
Energy, 766 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Consequently, the substantive evidentiary
standards apply to affidavits and declarations. Liesener v. Weslow, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 857, 860
(D. Md. 1991); Neal v. Bently Nevada Corp., 771 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (D. Nev. 1991); Dean v.
McKie Co., 771 F. Supp. 466, 468 (D. Mass. 1991).
58. See Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the
Supreme Court, 6 REv. LIToG. 263, 279 (1987).
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last decade. The tremendous backlog on civil trial calendars in most
metropolitan areas of the United States became increasingly clear over
the past few decades.5 9 These backlogs prompted the Supreme Court to
search for new means of terminating cases before trial. Prior to 1986,
disposing of a case by summary judgment was disfavored in federal prac-
tice.6° Most appellate courts discouraged trial courts from granting pre-
trial summary judgment 61 by decreeing that trial judges were to deny the
motion if they had "the slightest doubt" whether summary judgment was
appropriate.62
In 1986, however, the Court handed down three decisions, Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,63 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,4 and Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,65 which liberalized the test for
granting summary judgment. In these cases, the majority evinced a more
favorable attitude toward the disposition of cases on summary judg-
ment. 6 Over the long-term, there has been an increase in the percentage
of cases in which a summary judgment motion is filed; and the percent-
age of cases in which the motion is granted is also on the rise.67 Several
respected commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court's 1986
59. John Watkins, Remedies to Court Congestion, in JUSTICE ON TRIAL 162 (Donald
Douglas & Philip Noble eds., 1971); see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
MiTTEE (1990) (study and recommendations alleviate federal court congestion, delay, expense
and expansion); MALCOLM FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL 176 (1983) (examining suc-
cess or failure of major innovations aimed at overcoming court delay); JOHN GOERDT, EXAM-
INING COURT DELAY: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987, at xiii,
xv (1989) (concluding even efficiently managed courts face delay from heavy case loads).
60. Childress, supra note 58, at 265-66; see Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d
661, 669 (9th Cir. 1955) (stating procedure is not substitute for trial by jury).
61. E.g., Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945);
Childress, supra note 58, at 264.
62. Doehler, 149 F.2d at 135.
63. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
64. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
65. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
66. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (movant has no burden to disprove evidence, but must show
absence of evidence supporting non-moving party's case); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (Court
required plaintiff to meet evidentiary burden necessary at trial); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(Court required non-moving party to supply some evidence of disputed facts to preclude sum-
mary judgment); see also Deepwater Invs. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1113
(10th Cir. 1991) (any uncertainty in law governing summary judgment prior to 1986 resolved
by Supreme Court in "now-famous trilogy" of decisions).
67. Joe S. Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER DIRECTIONS, Apr. 1991, at 11, 12-16; see also John E. Kennedy,
Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett and Adickes v. Kress and the
Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv. LrrIG. 227, 254 (1987) ("On an overall rounded
average of existing studies, one could make a general estimate that the motion is made in five
percent of cases; that over 50% are granted; and of those appealed, that over 50% are
affirmed.").
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decisions will result in yet further increases, 63 and that summary judg-
ment will be granted more readily in the future.6 9 A Carnegie Commis-
sion report released in late 1991 asserts that "[r]ecent cases in which
defendants were awarded summary judgment in toxic tort cases suggest
that the granting, and perhaps the incidence of motions for summary
judgment has increased in this type of litigation."70 It would be an over-
statement to claim that every published opinion since 1986 is consistent
with a trend toward a more liberal grant of summary judgment.71 As a
whole, however, the post-1986 decisions indicate that "many lower
courts are getting the message" 72 that the Supreme Court favors ex-
panded use of the summary judgment mechanism. 73 The Civil Rules
Committee has proposed amendments to Rule 56 which would further
"enhance the utility of the summary judgment procedure as a means to
avoid the time and expense of... trial";74 and the President's Council on
Competitiveness, chaired by Vice-President Quayle, has recommended
"[r]eforming summary judgment" to make such judgment mandatory in
certain cases.75
B. In Limine Motions
Like a summary judgment hearing, a hearing on an in limine motion
to exclude or admit evidence is an ideal setting for enforcing exclusionary
rules. As with summary judgment motions, all the conditions for maxi-
mizing the impact of the rules are present. The party entitled to invoke
the rule and the presiding officer have time to recognize and critically
68. Childress, supra note 58, at 263, 265, 270, 280, 283; Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 770, 771, 787 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 67, at 251-52, 280.
69. Childress, supra note 58, at 283.
70. MARGARET A. BERGER, CARNEGIE COMM. ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND Gov-
ERNMENT, PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH EXPERTS IN
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION: A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 43 (1991).
71. Id.; see Rosinski v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D. Mich.
1990) (asserting summary judgment disfavored).
72. Childress, supra note 58, at 281.
73. Id. at 265; see Felders v. Miller, 776 F. Supp. 424, 426 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (recent
Supreme Court cases likely require summary judgment be more readily granted, signaling new
era for summary judgment); Hutton v. General Motors Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (D.
Nev. 19§ 1) (summary judgment not disfavored procedural shortcut, but integral part of federal
rules as whole); Witter v. Abell-Howe Co., 765 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (courts
should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment in appropriate cases); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hansten, 765 F. Supp. 614, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (summary judgment favored method of
resolution when appropriate).
74. FED. R. CIv. P. 56 advisory committee's note.
75. J. Danforth Quayle, Isn't Our Legal System in Need of Reform?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
19, 1991, at 9-10.
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evaluate the objection. Furthermore, neither has a significant disincen-
tive to apply the rule. The setting may, in fact, be better than the sum-
mary judgment context. In the summary judgment context, the judge
must perform two tasks. He or she must first rule on any objections to
evidence in the affidavits. The judge must then decide whether any re-
maining, admissible evidence creates a triable issue of fact. In the in
limine context, however, the judge's analysis is more focused. His or her
sole task is to rule on the admissibility of the proposed evidence. A rul-
ing which excludes the evidence may practically terminate the litigation
because losing parties may decide that they cannot survive a directed
verdict motion at trial or that they will probably suffer an adverse verdict
without the evidence. Nevertheless, the decision to abort the litigation
belongs to the losing party; the judge can devote his or her full attention
to the analysis of the application of the exclusionary rule.
The parallel between in limine motions and summary judgment mo-
tions continues because like the summary judgment motion, in limine
practice has been reinvigorated within recent years. Fifty years ago in
limine evidentiary motions were uncommon.76 Their popularity has
since been on the rise, however,77 and their use has expanded dramati-
cally both in civil and criminal cases. 7  The Supreme Court implicitly
approved the use of in limine motions in criminal prosecutions in Luce v.
United States,79 one of its most significant decisions on conviction im-
76. Tom H. Davis, The Motion in Limine-A Neglected Trial Technique, 5 WASHBURN
L.J. 232, 233 (1966) (citing Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 314 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1958);
McClintock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App., n.r.e., 1965); Burdick v.
York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App., n.r.e., 1963)); see, ag., Hill v. Gerheim, 214
A.2d 240, 242-43 (Pa. 1965) (reversing decision after evidence found improper, irrelevant and
inadmissible); Olivares v. Travelers, 442 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (reversing
decision after evidence found improper, irrelevant and inadmissible).
77. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103.8 (3d ed. 1991).
78. See RONALD L. CARLSON, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CIVIL TRIALS § 1:1, at 4
(1983) ("[Ihe use of the motion in limine is increasing rapidly in civil litigation."); Jay S.
Blumemkopf, The Motion In Limine: An Effective Procedural Device with No Material Down-
side Risk, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 181-82 (1981); Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in
Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271,
1280-82 (1987); Tom Davis, Motions In Limine: Tools for a Fair Trial, 18 TRIAL, Nov. 1982,
at 90, 90; Edna Selan Epstein, Motions in Limine-a Primer, LMG., Spring 1982, at 34, 34;
Charles W. Gamble, The Motion In Limine: A Pretrial Procedure That Has Come of Age, 33
ALA. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1981); Steven A. Saltzburg, Tactics of the Motion in Limine, LITIG.,
Summer 1983, at 17, 17; James A. Howell, Comment, The Use of Motions in Limine in Civil
Litigation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 443, 445-46 (1977); Johnny K. Richardson, Comment, Use of
Motions in Limine in Civil Proceedings, 45 Mo. L. REV. 130, 131 n.l1 (1980).
79. 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
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peachment8 ° Hearings on in limine motions are now routinely used in
criminal cases to determine the admissibility of pivotal items of evidence
such as DNA testimony8" and testimony about uncharged crimes com-
mitted by the accused.82 In keeping with this increase, the second edition
of the Manual for Complex Litigation devotes an entire section to the
subject of motions in limine.83
III. ADAPTING "TRIAL" EVIDENCE RULES TO THE PRETRIAL
STAGE WHERE THEY HAVE THE MAXIMUM IMPACT
Section II argued that evidence law now matters most at the post-
pleading, pretrial stage. Although the importance of evidentiary rules at
the various stages of the litigation process may vary, one would ordina-
rily assume that the rules themselves are a constant. Whether the judge
is applying the hearsay rule at trial or in a pretrial setting, he or she
should enforce the same rule in roughly the same manner. However,
that assumption is facile. Admittedly, the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion does not suggest that there is any need to adapt "trial" evidence
rules to pretrial practice. Upon close scrutiny, however, some eviden-
tiary rules are different in the pretrial context, and they should be modi-
fied to reflect that difference.
4. Some Evidentiary Rules Operate Differently in the Pretrial Setting
than at Trial
The Federal Rules of Evidence codify the exclusionary rules in fed-
eral practice, and determining the content of the exclusionary rules is an
exercise in statutory construction. In construing federal statutes, the
courts presume that Congress intends the general body of federal law to
80. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 127
(1987).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739 (D.S.D. 1990) (finding DNA evi-
dence reliable and denying in limine motion). Deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly called DNA,
is a molecule found in the nucleated cells of every living organism. The differences that exist in
certain fragments of the DNA chain, called polymorphisms, are highly variable and give each
individual his or her own unique DNA code. Hence, two samples of DNA can be compared to
show maternity or paternity. Id. at 740; see also Michael Berens, Pretrial Challenges to Expert
Testimony, 8 LIG., Summer 1982, at 27, 28-29, 64 (commenting on usefulness of in limine
motion in cases with complicated scientific evidence).
82. See generally IMWINKELRIED, supra note 33, at §§ 9:14-:18 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (dis-
cussing tactical considerations regarding motions in limine to admit or exclude uncharged
misconduct evidence).




be consistent.8 1 The courts, therefore, endeavor to harmonize the provi-
sions of the Federal Evidence Rules with those of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Reconciling apparent inconsistencies between the Federal Evidence
Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure underscores the poten-
tially differing application of evidence rules in the pretrial and the trial
settings. Consider, for instance, the interplay between Federal Rules of
Evidence 703 and 705, which govern the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 56, governing
pretrial discovery and summary judgments. Evidence Rule 703 ad-
dresses "[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference." 5 In the typical case, an expert witness
reasons syllogistically, usually applying a general scientific theory (a ma-
jor premise) to the specific factual data of the particular case (the minor
premise) to derive an opinion. 6 While Evidence Rule 703 controls the
type of information which experts may factor into their minor premise,
8 7
Rule 705 states that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or infer-
ence and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise." 8 Rules 703 and 705
thus allow experts to state their ultimate opinion on direct examination
at trial without revealing the precise content of their minor premise.
Rule 705 further provides that the opposing attorney may probe the mi-
nor premise on cross-examination. The cross-examiner thus has the bur-
den of exploring the content of the minor premise8 9
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 relates to pretrial discovery.
Rule 26(b)(4) contemplates extensive advance disclosure of opposing ex-
perts' opinions and the bases of the opinion.90 Civil Procedure Rule 56
governs summary judgment.9' As indicated above, parties submit evi-
dence to the presiding officer at a summary judgment hearing in the form
84. Independent Community Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
820 F.2d 428, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
85. FED. R. EVID. 703.
86. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogis-
tic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1988) (documenting failure of
courts to distinguish between major and minor premise in expert testimony).
87. Id. at 16-19.
88. FED. R. EVID. 705.
89. GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 705.1, at 680.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (through interrogatories, party may "require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial,
to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion.").
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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of affidavits. Rule 56(e) sets out the requirements for these affidavits.
The pertinent part of the rule provides that "[s]upporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 92
These provisions raise the question of whether Evidence Rules 703
and 705 apply to summary judgment affidavits in the same manner in
which they apply at trial. On direct examination at trial, experts can
withhold the minor premise of their opinion. May attorneys who draft
summary judgment affidavits for the experts similarly omit any mention
of the experts' minor premise, stating nothing more than the experts'
credentials, their major premise, and their ultimate opinion?
Commentators and courts have suggested that the Evidence and
Civil Procedure Rules cannot be reconciled unless Rule of Evidence 705
is specially adapted to the pretrial setting.93 They believe that experts'
affidavits cannot create a triable issue of fact at summary judgment hear-
ings unless they state all the essential bases for the experts' opinion, in-
cluding minor premises.94 They further argue that without a statement
of the experts' minor premise, the affidavit does not "show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to" 95 his or her ultimate opinion.
96
In 1977, Judge Skelly Wright discussed the interplay between these
Federal Rules in Merit Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.97 He refused to
construe Rules 703 and 705 to preclude summary judgment when the
party resisting the motion submits an expert affidavit asserting a con-
clusory, favorable opinion. 98 Judge Wright stated that a contrary con-
clusion "seriously undermines the policies of Rule 56" 99-- policies which
the Supreme Court strengthened in its three 1986 decisions on summary
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
93. See Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (111.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981);
The Hon. Charles Chapman & Robert Robertson, To Boldly Go Where No One Has Gone
Before." The Final Frontier of Illinois Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Malpractice Cases,
21 Loy. U. CHI. L.L 757, 793-95 (1990); see also GRAHAM, supra note 77, § 705.1, at 655-56
(Rule 705 places heavy burden on cross-examiner who must be sufficiently informed to expose
weaknesses in expert's opinion during trial).
94. Chapman & Robertson, supra note 93, at 793-95.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
96. Chapman & Robertson, supra note 93, at 778.
97. 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
98. Id. at 672-73; see also United States v. Various Slot Machines on Guam, 658 F.2d 697,
700-01 (9th Cir. 1981) (expert opinion without factual support cannot defeat summary judg-
ment motion).
99. Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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judgment.1" One Utah court reached the same conclusion in 1990.11
The relevant provisions of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Civil Proce-
dure are virtually identical to the Federal Rules. 102 The court ruled that,
despite Utah's Evidence Rule 705, a conclusory expert affidavit would
not pass muster under Utah's Civil Procedure Rule 56.103 The court
stated that the "explicit requirements" of Rule 56 "control in the sum-
mary judgment context over... Utah R. Evid. 705."' °
The Merit Motors reasoning may extend beyond Federal Evidence
Rules 703 and 705. Rule 705 has the practical impact of assigning the
cross-examiner the burden of challenging the propriety of the expert's
minor premise.1 5 The direct examination's evidentiary foundation no
longer requires presenting the facts which constitute the minor premise.
There are other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence which like-
wise allocate a burden to the party opposing the admission of relevant
testimony.
Federal Evidence Rule 803(8)(C), for example, authorizes the ad-
mission of factual findings in official investigative reports "unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustwor-
thiness." 10 6 The cases construing the Rule have assigned the burden of
establishing the existence of "circumstances" demonstrating the untrust-
worthiness of the record to the party opposing the admission of the rec-
ord.107 Article X of the Evidence Rules, the best evidence doctrine, also
100. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text; see also Genmoora Corp. v. Moore
Business Forms, Inc., 939 F.2d 1149, 1157 (5th Cir. 1991) (expert's testimony will not support
verdict if it lacks adequate foundation in facts of case); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770
F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 do not alter require-
ment of Rule 56(e) that affidavit must set forth specific facts); Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v.
United States Golf Ass'n, 766 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (party may not avoid
summary judgment solely on basis of expert's opinion affidavit which does not provide specific
facts from record to support conclusions); Lynch v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 758 F. Supp. 976, 1006
(D.N.J. 1991) (factual predicate of opinion of expert must find some support in record; expert
opinion which contains no support for factual assertions should be rejected); Amorello v. Mon-
santo Corp., 463 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (summary disposition not precluded
simply because party has produced expert to support position); Omni Aviation v. Perry, 807
S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (Federal Rule 703 not intended to make summary
judgment impossible whenever party has produced expert to support position, nor to preclude
summary judgment against party who relies solely on expert's opinion which has no bases
other than theoretical speculation).
101. Gaw v. State ex rel. Dept. of Trans., 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990).
102. Compare UTAH R. Civ. P. 26, 56 and UTAH R. EVID. 703, 705 with FED. R. Civ. P.
26, 56 and FED. R. EVID. 703, 705.
103. Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1137 n.10.
104. Id
105. GRAHAM, supra note 77, § 705.1, at 655.
106. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
107. Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1984); Melville v.
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contains a provision shifting a burden to the opponent. Rule 1003 states
that a duplicate is as admissible as an original "unless (1) a general ques-
tion is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circum-
stances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original." 108 Under this statute, the party opposing the admission of the
duplicate has the burden of persuasion on the lack of authenticity ques-
tion within the "unless" clause." 9
In light of Merit Motors, if a party relies on a duplicate or a factual
finding in an official investigative report at a summary judgment hearing,
the accompanying affidavit arguably should address the admissibility
facts on which the opposing party would otherwise have the burden. It is
true that at trial, the opposing party would have the burden on those
issues to negate the admissibility of the evidence. However, in the words
of Rule 56 governing summary judgment, without a factual showing with
respect to those issues the party relying on the duplicate or official record
would have failed to fully show that the facts stated in his or her affida-
vits and exhibits "would be admissible in evidence." 110 In the case of the
best evidence rule, the logic of Merit Motors could be extended to require
that the affidavits establish both the authenticity of the original and the
completeness of the duplicate. Similarly, in the case of official records,
Judge Wright's reasoning could justify mandating that the affidavits not
only satisfy the express requirements of Rule 803(8)(C) but also set out
enough facts to permit the judge to make an informed evaluation of the
general trustworthiness of the record.
American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1978); see also DAVID F.
BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 40.03, at 608-09 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing burden of oppos-
ing party to demonstrate untrustworthiness); GRAHAM, supra note 77, § 803.8, at 880 n.23
("The burden is on the party opposing admissibility to demonstrate that the report is not
reliable."); 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 456, at 766 (1980) (opponents to admission of record bear burden of proving record untrust-
worthy); GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.46, at 439 (1987) ("opponent of
such evidence bears the burden of proving the untrustworthiness of the record once its propo-
nents meet the foundational requirements"); James B. Haddad, The Future of Confrontation
Clause Developments: What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse
Lines of Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 85 (1990) (defendant
should be able to demonstrate that business or official records so unreliable they should be
excluded under Confrontation Clause).
108. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
109. People v. Atkins, 210 Cal. App. 3d 47, 55, 258 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1989) ("Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 .... the burden is on the opponent to raise a genuine issue as to
the authenticity of the original or to show that under the circumstances it would be unfair to
use the duplicate in lieu of the original."); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED et al., supra note 80,
§ 1506, at 62.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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B. As a Matter of Policy, Some Evidentiary Standards Should Be
Applied Differently in the Pretrial Setting
Whether evidence is presented at trial or a pretrial summary judg-
ment hearing, the opposing party must be afforded the opportunity to
object to its admission. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), which regu-
lates evidentiary objections, announces that the party opposing the ad-
mission of the evidence must "stat[e] the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context."
111
The rub is the interpretation of the expression, "specific ground of
objection." A split of authority has arisen over the proper construction
of that expression. The traditional view is that an objection is sufficiently
specific if it names the generic evidentiary rule being violated." 2 Thus,
to preserve the issue for appeal, it would be satisfactory for the objector
to say that a question called for hearsay or that there was inadequate
authentication of an exhibit. 1 3 However, there is a competing view that
the objector must be more precise and must name the missing founda-
tional element. 1 4 For instance, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) states
that the business entry hearsay exception requires foundational proof
that "it was the regular practice of that business ... to make the [type of]
memorandum" in question. 15 Suppose that the proponent offering a
business entry neglects to present that element of foundational testimony.
Under the minority view, the objector would have to do more than in-
form the judge that the exhibit is inadmissible hearsay; the objector
would have to take the next step and add that there is no proof that the
business routinely prepared this type of record.
It makes good sense to adhere to the traditional view to trial objec-
tions while simultaneously adopting the minority view as the standard
for pretrial practice. It is unrealistic to expect the opposing attorney to
designate precisely the missing foundational element in a fast-moving
trial setting. At trial, under penalty of waiver, the opposing attorney
must voice objections to questions before the witness begins the an-
swer." 6 The gap between the end of the question and the beginning of
the answer is usually a matter of a few seconds. It is impractical to de-
111. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).
112. CARLSON et al., supra note 6, at 123.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1975); see also People v.
Dorsey, 43 Cal. App. 3d 953, 959-60, 118 Cal. Rptr. 362, 366 (1974) (failure to state specific
ground of objection waives appellate review under CAL. EVID. CODE § 353(a)).
115. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
116. CARLSON et al., supra note 6, at 122.
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mand that the opposing attorney' do much more, in such a short time,
than identify the exclusionary rule being violated.
This time problem evaporates, however, in a hearing on a summary
judgment or an in limine motion. Before the hearing on a summary
judgment motion, parties reduce the evidence to affidavit form. The op-
posing attorney has hours or days-rather than seconds-to carefully
review the evidentiary material in the affidavits. Even during hearings on
oral in limine motions, the time constraint is lacking. The hearing is held
pretrial in the jury's absence; there is no jury to excuse from the court-
room or otherwise inconvenience. Consequently, the presiding officer
generally gives the party opposing the admission of the proffered evi-
dence ample opportunity to listen to the evidence and critique its
admissibility.
The minority view is the preferable standard in the pretrial setting,
and it should be adopted for that stage. In the United States and gener-
ally in the common-law world, trials are characterized by orality and
spontaneity. For the most part, testimony at trial is presented orally, and
objections are voiced orally. Even if an evidentiary objection is sus-
tained, the proponent of the evidence can immediately attempt to over-
come the objection by laying a better foundation. The oral character of
the proceeding thus facilitates impromptu response by the proponent. In
contrast, in summary judgment hearings, both evidence and objections
are reduced to written form. The documentary character of the proceed-
ing eliminates the proponent's capacity for impromptu response. If the
proponent is ignorant of the exact nature of the objection before the hear-
ing and the officer sustains the objection at the hearing, the proponent
will be unable to respond immediately. The attorney cannot revise the
affiant's sworn affidavit, and the affiant is not present to give live, supple-
mentary testimony. In a pretrial setting, therefore, the minority view is
fairer to the proponent.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Professor Hazard has pointed out, in substantial litigation today,
"pre-trial is the trial.""' 7 Many civil claims are settled before suit is even
filed.I" In the vast majority of jurisdictions, fewer than five percent of
the suits filed ever reach trial." 9 The statistics on the criminal side are
comparable. Roughly ninety percent of all criminal cases filed in the
117. Maher, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr.).
118. Joseph Kelner, Settlement Techniques-Part One, TRIAL, Feb. 1980, at 39.
119. David M. Balabanian, Concept of "Discovery Abuse" Has Been Oversold, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1984, at 14.
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United States result in a plea bargain instead of a trial.120 The advent of
pretrial practice as "the center of gravity"1 21 in contemporary litigation
is changing the face of civil and criminal procedure. Increasingly, the
Manualfor Complex Litigation is becoming a primer on complicated pre-
trial procedures.
The postpleading, pretrial stage is emerging as a new focal point for
evidence law as well because it is the stage at which the exclusionary
evidentiary rules matter the most. At the pretrial stage, the participants
have both the time and the motivation to give the exclusionary rules their
full play and effect. It is no accident that many of the most significant
recent evidence decisions were triggered by pretrial rulings.' 2 2 Pretrial
hearings are also becoming fora for the modification of evidence law it-
self. Because the pretrial procedural setting differs markedly from the
trial context, evidentiary rules, such as Rules 703 and 705, should be
adapted to pretrial practice. Evidence law matters most at the pretrial
stage, and it remains to be seen how that development will transform
American evidence law.
120. George Beall, Negotiating the Disposition of Criminal Charges, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at
46.
121. John W. Cooley, Puncturing Three Myths about Litigation, 70 A.B.A. J. 75, 76 (1984).
122. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) (content of witness's trial testimony deter-
mines admissibility of prior conviction for impeachment purposes under FED. R. EVID.
609(a)); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(expert's reports inadmissible at summary judgment stage where expert's assumptions invaded
province of fact finder and based on faulty underlying data).
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